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AFFIRMATIVE BENEFITS OF INDUSTRIAL MERGERS AND
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
RICHAARD A. GIVENS t
The 1950 amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act' not only made
acquisitions of assets as well as stock subject to its limitations upon
mergers, but also made it clear that section 7 prohibited some mergers
which would be permitted if section 2 of the Sherman Act with its prohibition of monopolizing had been the only standard.2 The 1957 decision in
the DuPont-GM case 3 further indicated that even the unamended section 7
could be applied to strike down stock acquisitions made many years in
the past, while the Bethlehem-Youngstow 4 and Americn Crystal Sugar'
decisions demonstrated the amended section was likely to be vigorously
applied. In the light of these decisions, it becomes important to consider
the possible relevance of affirmative benefits of mergers questioned
under the section.
Price competition between two enterprises is as completely eliminated by a combination of the two into one enterprise as by an agreement between them upon the prices to be charged. Yet the price fixing
fMember of the New York Bar; M.S. in Economics, University of Wisconsin,
1954; L.L.B., Columbia University School of Law, 1959.
1. "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the

assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
"No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more
corporations engaged in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such
stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
"This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about or in attempting
to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. Nor shall anything contained
in this section prevent a corporation engaged in commerce from causing the formation of
subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their immediate lawful business,
or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof, or from owning and holding
all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the effect of such
formation is not to substantially lessen competition ...
"
64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
2. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
3. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
4. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
5. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F. 2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1958), affirming 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

agreement is clearly illegal in and of itself under the antitrust laws,0
whereas the merger will be frequently upheld. A sharp distinction has developed under the antitrust laws between loose-knit combinations among
independent enterprises, which are frequently held illegal per se, and
close-knit combinations resulting in a unified enterprise, which are not.'
In order to develop workable criteria for the legality of close-knit combinations, we must search for the basis for this distinction between looseknit and close-knit combinations and seek to understand the reasons lying
behind it.
These reasons cannot lie in differences in the lessening of competition resulting from close-knit and loose-knit combinations. Competition
is eliminated far more completely by a close-knit combination such as a
merger than by agreements limited to specific business policies. If the
impact upon competition were the sole test, either both close and looseknit combinations would fare equally harshly, or the loose-knit would
be more frequently permitted. Yet the result has been the precise opposite.
A clue to the basis for holding many kinds of loose-knit combinations illegal in themselves while upholding far more competition-destroying close-knit combinations is suggested in the opinion in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States,9 holding preferential routing contracts between
a railroad and lessees of its lands unlawful under the Sherman Act:
. . . there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal. .

.

. "o (Emphasis added.)

The question of "lack of any redeeming virtue" is the chief distinction between those kinds of loose-knit combinations which are held in
6. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). See also United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951).
7. See, concerning section 2 of the Sherman Act, United States v. Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417
(1920); Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 179
(1932) ; concerning section 7 of the Clayton Act before the 1950 amendment, United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935); International Shoe
Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) ; V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC, 54 F. 2d 273 (2d Cir. 1931);
Note, 52 COLUm. L. Rxv. 766 (1952).
8. Compare United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 692 (1927) with
United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927) ; compare cases cited
in HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 193-308 with id. 428-517
(2d ed. 1951).
9. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
10. Id. at 5.
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unreasonable restraint of trade in and of themselves and the close-knit
combinations. Loose-knit combinations such as agreements fixing prices"'
or allocating markets 2 do not permit economies of scale or from unified
management to be achieved, nor do they permit the greater resources of
unified enterprises to become available for research or development. On
the contrary, such loose combinations for internal political reasons must
seek to maintain their least efficient members in business at the expense
of the public. Thus the loose-knit combinations which have been condemned have none of the redeeming virtues which sometimes apply to
large industrial enterprises, arising through mergers or internal growth."
That the distinction between loose-knit and close-knit combinations
is essentially based upon the probable affirmative benefits of many closeknit combinations was explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in
holding that DuPont did not have an illegal monopoly in the cellophane
market: "A considerable size is often essential for efficient operation in
research, manufacture and distribution."' 4 This does not mean that
larger units are necessarily more efficient in all cases, or in any particular
case. " It does suggest that the reason for our reluctance to break up or
block close-knit combinations has been our desire not to obstruct the development of enterprises of the size necessary for modern industrialism.
The chief cases prior to 1950 in which close-knit combinations were
broken up or blocked under the antitrust laws have been railroad cases
during the period when competing forms of transportation had not yet
11. See note 6 supra for cases exemplifying the rule of per se illegality.
12. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 241 (1899);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945); ATrr'y.
GEN. NAT'L. Coimm. ANTITRUST REP. 26 (1955); Rifkind, Dhvision of Territories, in
VAN CISE & DUNN, HOW TO COMNPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 127 (1954); Cf.
Norfolk Southern Bus Co. v. Virginia Dare Co., 159 F.2d 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 827 (1947).
13. PRIBRAM, CARTEL PROBLEMS 86-87 (1953); see BURNS, THE DECLINE OF CoMPETITION 20-21 (1936); Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 683-84 (1958). Even loose-knit
combinations have been upheld, of course, where the specific facts indicated that possible
affirmative benefits took the restraints out of the intent of the antitrust prohibitions.
See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) ; see also
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) ; Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). On the other hand, many specific kinds of looseknit combinations have been held so devoid of redeeming virtue as to be illegal in and
of themselves. See, e.g., cases cited notes 6, 12, supra.
14. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386 (1956).
15. On the relationship between size and efficiency which can be either favorable
or unfavorable depending upon the circumstances, see the authorities cited in Kessler
& Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertidal Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 8-10 (1959) ;
Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1654-1662 (1959); Note, 58 CoLu.c. L. REv. 673, 683 n. 74
(1958).
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come into their own." Except for the early railroad cases, the decision
of Judge Learned Hand in the Alcoa case in 1945"T was the only successful major challenge before 1950 to a large unified enterprise or closeknit combination based upon its degree of market control as distinct from
its coercive methods, and even there no relief was ultimately awarded
because of changed conditions at the time relief was considered."8
Prior to the 1950 amendment, section 7 of the Clayton Act had been
almost completely a dead letter. It did not apply to acquisitions of assets
but only to acquisitions of stock.' 0 If the party acquiring stock could
then consummate an asset acquisition before proceedings began, the statute was held inapplicable.2" Since a literal interpretation of the wording
of the 1914 act would have banned all stock acquisitions between competing corporations it was held to merely prohibit such acquisitions as would
be banned in any event by the Sherman Act.2"
The 1950 act was designed to correct these shortcomings.22 In this
context, it is clear that no general presumption that mergers are necessary to industrial efficiency should be permitted to make the amended
section 7 a dead letter as was its predecessor; on the other hand, there is
also no need to assume that it was the intention of Congress to completely
obliterate the distinction between close-knit and loose-knit combinations
which had been a part of our antitrust philosophy for many years, or to
ignore the reasons behind this distinction. In fact, should section 7 be
rigidly applied to prohibit almost all mergers of any size, it might run
counter to an overriding national policy of protecting the productiveness
of our economy in its great competition with totalitarian systems. The
courts have in fact avoided commitment to any automatic approach of
illegality in section 7 cases by interpreting the statutory criterion of "to
substantially lessen competition" as contemplating a qualitative rather
than merely a quantitative inquiry. 2'
16. E.g., United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922) ; United States
v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920) ; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197 (1904).
17. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945),
approved in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
18. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 153 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) ; 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
19. FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926); United States v. Celanese
Corp. of America, 91 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
20. Arrow-Hart & Hegemen Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); see Note, 52
COLOm. L. REv. 766, 769 (1952).

21. See authorities cited, note 7 supra.
22. See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. RE'. No. 1775, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
23. See Note, 58 CoLum. L. Rav. 1269, 1281-82 (1958).
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The difficulty with considering the underlying reasons for the distinction between close-knit and loose-knit combinations in section 7 cases
involving close-knit combinations is that it may lead to an incredibly complex economic investigation which the courts are ill-equipped to undertake2" and which will frequently lead to inconclusive results.25 For these
reasons, many courts have taken the position that they cannot consider
whether, for example, a proposed merger will increase industrial efficiency,2 and this has not been recognized as a separate and independent
defense in any decision under the amended section 7.27 It appears probable that affirmative benefits based upon efficiency will not be recognized as a separate defense in section 7 cases. The same appears true of
any defense based upon the revitalizing of competition by a stronger
merged enterprise competing with others.2" The defense that one party
to the merger would otherwise fail has been accepted in some cases.2" This
defense flows logically from the fact that the competition of the failing
firm would be eliminated in any event, by either merger or failure. The
case where one party to a merger would otherwise fail is a clear example
of the relevance of affirmative benefits but is a special situation from
which it is difficult to generalize to the more controversial kinds of
cases where affirmative benefits are alleged.
Assuming that no detailed economic inquiry into whether a challenged merger will or will not strengthen economic productiveness can
be workably undertaken in section 7 cases, the inquiry here is whether
broad distinctions between types of acquisitions nevertheless can give
some effect to the reasons underlying the distinction between close and
loose-knit combinations without involving an "economic extravaganza."
One way in which these questions will be considered by the courts is
24. Cf. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)

(one reason

for per se rules in Sherman Act cases is to avoid "an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation.")
25. See COOK, THE EFFECTS OF MERGERS 433, 442 (1958) ; Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1627,

1654-1662 (1959); Cf. Stedman, The Merger Statute: Sleeping Giant or Sleeping
Beauty?, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 567, 593-612 (1957).
26. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) ; cases cited, Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1661 n. 174, 175 (1958) ; but see cases
cited, id., 1655 n. 137.
27. See Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1269, 1285-86 (1958).
28. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 399-400
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); see the objectives stated in
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,

1st Sess. 2-3 (1949).
29. See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930); Handler, Industrial
Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COLUMi. L. REV. 179, 269 (1932) ; Note, 68 YALE
L.J. 1627, 1662-68 (1959); Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 421 (1959); 46 ILL. L. REv. 444,
460-62 (1951).
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as an undefined felt element in decisions articulated in terms of the degree of lessening of competition. Thus, for example, the concept of
relevant market" is highly flexible, as are the concepts of substantial
lessening of competition, and of lines of commerce and sections of the
country. In fact, there is no principle which dictates that these terms
mean precisely the same thing in different contexts."' If two mergers
are under consideration, one in a vital defense industry involving large
scale research efforts requiring expensive facilities and huge investments
in plant and equipment, the other in a light consumer goods industry
where only a small investment is clearly necessary for efficient operations,
the decisions in the two cases may well differ even if no explicit issue
concerning efficiency is tried. Whether or not this kind of weighing of
background factors which are not always articulated is desirable, it is
probably at least to some extent inevitable, and should be recognized.
There are, however, three broad distinctions which may be drawn
between different kinds of close-knit combinations without a detailed
inquiry into the economic circumstances in each case.
The first is whether the combination involves merely a stock acquisition, or an actual integration of industrial operations. Where merely
a stock acquisition is involved, the possible advantages in terms of industrial economies are greatly lessened if they are present at all. On the
other hand the lessening of competition may be almost as great as where
there is complete integration. Consequently, mere acquisitions of stock
without any integration of operations might properly be classed as looseknit rather than dose-knit combinations for purposes of the distinction
drawn between these two types of combinations under the antitrust laws.
Such an interpretation would find support in the fact that stock acquisitions were restricted by the 1914 version of section 7 long before its
amendment in 1950 to include asset acquisitions as well. In 1914, Congress felt that stock acquisitions alone were often particularly undesirable,
and this judgment may remain valid today, even though asset acquisitions
are also subject to .judicial review under amended section 7. This ap2
proach would be supported by, and explain the result in, the DuPont-GM
case which struck down the holding of substantial portions of GM stock
30. See Dirlam & Stelzer, The DuPont-GeneralMotors Decision: In the Antitrust
Grain, 58 COLIJ. L. REv. 24, 38-42 (1958). Compare United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. (GM), 353 U.S. 586 (1957), with United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
31. "The same words, in different settings, may not mean the same thing."
Frankfurter, J. in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 678 (1950).
See also Frank, J. in R. H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F. 2d 690, 696 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952).
32. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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by a substantial seller to GM even though the acquisition had occurred
many years earlier. Viewed as confined to a case where there is no industrial integration which might promote the public interest in economic
productivity, the decision would not necessarily have the drastic results
often attributed to it.33 The fact that the reasons for more favorable
treatment of close-knit combinations were absent in the DuPont-GM case
forms a ground for distinguishing that decision as a precedent in a future
case where a true close-knit combination is involved; it also strengthens
the applicability of DuPont-GM in future cases where purely stock acquisitions, which would have been subject to attack under the 1914 version
of section 7 as well as the amended section, are challenged. This would
not mean that stock acquisitions not contemplating industrial integration
should be illegal in themselves, but that a greater showing of lessening of
competition might properly be required where industrial integration is
involved than where, as in DuPont-GM, only a stock acquisition is challenged. The test here would not be a purely formal one of whether a
separate corporate entity survived as a subsidiary whose stock was held
by the acquiring company, but rather a realistic one of whether integration of operations was involved or not. Of course if stock acquisitions
are used as a coercive method of competition against the corporation
whose stock is purchased, a further issue also arises.34
A second distinction which may be drawn is between recent acquisitions of stock or assets and those which are many years old. The
DziPont-GM case indicates that there is no time limit on the application
of section 7 and that the lessening of competition is to be judged at the
time of adjudication rather than at the time of acquisition. This case,
however, involved a stock acquisition only, as previously pointed out.
The breaking up of an industrial merger of many years standing would
33. For criticisms of the decision based upon its applicability to section 7 cases
generally rather than merely those where there was no industrial integration see, e.g.,
Adelman, The DuPont-GeneralMotors Decision, 43 VA. L. REv. 873 (1957) ; Handler,

Annual Review of Recent Antitrust Developments, 12 THE REcoRD 411 (1957) ; Markham, The DuPont-GeneralMotors Decision, 43 VA. L. REv. 881 (1957) ; Rogers, U.S.
v. DuPont-A Judicial Revision of section 7, 2 ANTITRUST BULL., 581 (1957). A further
problem raised by stock acquisition cases such as DuPont-GM concerns the tax consequences of divestiture of the stock at one time or during a limited time. This problem
could be dealt with by separate legislation. See Note, 6 HOWARD L.J. 70 (1960) ; H.R.
REP. No. 8126, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). Another alternative would be the use of a
voting trust removing the power of voting from the stock in question, if that would
be an adequate remedy in the particular case.
34. Cf. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1958), affirming 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Of course, in determining
whether a stock acquisition may substantially lessen competition, the questions of whether
the acquisition was for investment purposes only, or for control, and of the degree of
control acquired, are relevant.
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involve two great difficulties absent in the DuPont-GM case: (1) the
assets and identities of the merged enterprises might be inseparably intertwined, leading to difficulties in accomplishing a separation ("unscrambling the eggs") ; and (2) industrial efficiency might suffer because of the disruption of established relationships within the working
parts of an integrated enterprise. Accordingly it should be held that
where a consummated merger involving actual integration of operations
of several years standing is challenged, either the standards of section
7 of the Clayton Act should approach those of the Sherman Act, or the
Sherman Act rather than the Clayton Act test should be held to apply.
This would mean that except where true monopolization is approached,
coercive practices would be necessary for condemnation.35 Such a differentiation is logical in view of the distinction between section 7 and
the Sherman Act itself.
A third distinction may be drawn between cases where some justification of a merger as designed to make possible integrated operations for
more efficient research or production is presented, and where no such
justification exists in any degree. This is relevant not merely to whether
affirmative benefits would in fact flow from the merger, but to the issue
of lessening of competition itself. The Northern Pacific Ry. case3" indicates that where a tying agreement is entered into, it will be assumed to
be an exercise of monopoly power unless some other explanation is offered. Where no affirmative public benefits whatsoever are presented
in support of a challenged merger, it is likely to be assumed as a practical
matter that the chief purpose was to gain greater market power for the
acquiring concern. Evidence of possible public benefits through efficiency or other results should be admitted at least for the purpose of repelling such an adverse inference. The issue then would not be whether
the claimed benefits would in fact flow from the merger, but rather
whether there was a sufficient possibility of such benefits to afford a
motive for the merger other than a naked increase in market power. If
a motive other than increase in market power alone might reasonably
have existed, the probabilities are less that a substantial lessening of competition will result. While a motive to secure affirmative benefits of
industrial efficiency need not be inconsistent with a further motive to
secure greater market power, if the sole motive were to add market power
the inference might be drawn that a lessening of competition would be
35. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75-76 (1911) ; United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
36. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958). See 58 COLUt.
L. REv. 887, 890-91 & n.38 (1958).
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especially probable. The defendant should be allowed to negate such an
inference by showing affirmatively any motive to secure benefits other
than market power. That the aim of business conduct is relevant to determining its probable result was made clear in the Trenton Potteries decision which laid down the rule that private price fixing agreements were
unreasonable in themselves, when the Court said that "the aim and result
of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one
form of competition."37 (Emphasis added.)
Since the issue would be whether there was any motive for the
merger other than an increase in market power, rather than whether
affirmative benefits would actually result, an "economic extravaganza"
should not be necessary. If the defendant is able to introduce any evidence at all of reasonably contemplated affirmative benefits, this should
be pertinent on the issue of motive, without attempting to determine
whether the contemplated benefits would in fact flow from the merger.
By the same token, this would not make affirmative benefits a separate
defense in a section 7 case, because even though the motives underlying
the merger were found to be other than mere aggregation of market power,
the court might nevertheless find that the merger did substantially lessen
competition. Motive is merely one element to be considered on the issue
of lessening of competition, and possible affirmative benefits constitute
one factor to be considered in evaluating the probable motives for an
acquisition. The distinction concerning evidence of motive of course
interlaces with that between actual industrial integration and the mere
acquisition of stock, because in a purely stock acquisition such as that
in the DuPont-GM case where no integration of operiations occurred, the
motive for the acquisition could not have been affirmative benefits to
operating effectiveness, but rather either control, investment or both.
Finally, the controls which are available to limit any abuses which
might result from greater market power may be relevant. Thus if an
industry is subjected to detailed regulation, the benefits which may flow
from large enterprise may outweigh possible abuses which are limited by
regulation, even though the merger might otherwise be held unlawful.
This is recognized in the provisions of amended section 7 referring to
the authority of the major federal regulatory agencies. It may also be
recognized in Sherman Act cases under the flexibility of the rule of
38

reason.

37. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
38. See Note, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 673, 681-88 (1958); see also Givens, Parallel

Business Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 5

ANTITRUST BULL. 273, 286-89 (1960).
Regulation, while significant as a safeguard of the public interest, is regarded today
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If these differences between kinds of cases in which stock and asset
acquisitions are challenged are recognized, the purposes underlying section 7 will be more fully realized, because it will not be necessary to hold
the section inapplicable in almost all cases, as under the old section 7, in
order to prevent unworkably drastic results. A recognition that two factors must be weighed in each case, the benefits of the acquisition, and
its detriment to competition, will lead to more workable results consistent
with the public interest. The difficulties of weighing each factor may
lead the courts to seek to develop categories of kinds of cases rather
than viewing each case as an entirely new problem. In the case of the
benefits of mergers, some of the categories which may warrant consideration relate to whether an acquisition involves integration of operations
or merely stock control; whether the combination was recent or of many
years standing; whether reasons other than an extension of market control can account for the combination; and whether regulatory controls
may counter-balance possible abuses of market power.
The question remains whether these distinctions are permissible under the statute. It appears that they are. The differentiation between
purely stock acquisitions and asset acquisitions involving industrial integration finds support in the early recognition of the need to limit stock
acquisitions in the 1914 act, which was continued in the 1950 amendment.
Asset acquisitions once accomplished are difficult to reverse, and unlike
stock ownership do not exercise an identifiable separate and continuing
influence upon competition which can be measured at the time of adjudication as distinct from the time of acquisition. Whether a motive,
other than desire to increase market power, can be shown for an acquisition is itself probative of the probable effect upon competition and is
hence clearly relevant. Finally, regulation is explicitly recognized as relevant in section 7, and may be considered under the rule of reason where
the Sherman Act is invoked.
The consideration of these factors is also consistent with our fundamental developing philosophy of antitrust law. Such consideration will
take account of the underlying reasons for the difference of treatment of
close-knit and loose-knit combinations. It can do so without involving
an "economic extravaganza" or passing upon masses of economic evidence
in each case. It will not nullify the congressional purpose, expressed in
the 1950 act, that mergers be realistically scrutinized for their effect
upon competition rather than being almost routinely upheld as under the
1914 act. It will make section 7 more workable and thereby strengthen
its long-term prospects for effectiveness.
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The gTeat economic power of the large organizations created by, and
frequently necessary to, modern industrialism can be dealt with in several
different ways. One approach is to consolidate all power in a single
agency, against which the individual is helpless. This is the approach of
the totalitarian dictatorship, whether of extreme left or extreme right.
We have rejected that approach. A second approach, favored by Mr.
Justice Brandeis,"9 would be to seek to break up large units into small
decentralized segments. This approach is not workable today. The third
approach is to seek to insure that concentrated power is responsibly exercised, while refusing to permit large increases in concentration of
power where it is not truly necessary. It is this third course which we
have followed in its broad outlines. Interpretation of section 7 to include
some reference to the benefits of, and need for, industrial combinations,
without either making the section a dead letter as was the 1914 act, or
engaging in an "economic extravaganza," is in accord with this tradition.
It is significant that Mr. Justice Stone, one of the greatest architects
of our antitrust law,4" while he took the same position in the case in question, refused to join Justice Brandeis' opinion exploring the evils of bigness as such." On the other hand, he felt most deeply that power implied
responsibility. In fact, he was willing to read that principle into broad
statutory provisions42 perhaps on the ground that it was a presupposition
which Congress must have intended to be applicable where broad language
permitted its application.4
An interpretation of section 7 to permit some consideration of the
as a less complete safeguard than it once was. See Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the
Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARv. L. Rzv. 1105 (1954).
39. See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 580 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
For an interesting recent discussion of the pros and cons of this position, see Berle,
Legal Problems of Economic Power, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 4 (1960), and Cary, Comment,
id. at 11.
40. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925);
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reasons for stock and asset acquisitions, even though these reasons would
not constitute a separate and complete defense in a section 7 case, would
be in accord with the philosophy underlying Mr. Justice Stone's approach.
To the extent that the justifications for an acquisition can be considered
without an "economic extravaganza," the courts will in effect exercise
judicial review over the use of economic power in this specific field, balancing the need for the acquisition against the detriment to competition
and its values. Cutting across the desirability of such a full balancing of
the conflicting needs is the unworkability of a full consideration of the
economic factors in each case. This is reflected in the wording of the
statute, which in terms refers only to the impact upon competition. However, some recognition of the possible justifications of an acquisition, to
the highly limited extent discussed here, would seem both workable and
consistent with the statutory scheme. It would be in accord with the public interest and would help to strengthen the workability and long-range
effectiveness of the antitrust laws, and through them, of our economy.

